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THE SCOPE OF THE DISCLOSURE DUTY UNDER
SEC RULE 14e-3
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 ('34 Act) pro-
hibits fraud in connection with a tender offer.' Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rule 14e-31 requires any person in possession of
material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer either to
disclose the information publicly or to abstain from trading in the
securities involved in the tender offer. 4 A duty to disclose inside informa-
tion or abstain from trading has traditionally applied only to a corporate
insider.5 Rule 14e-3 requires careful examination because the rule im-
poses a duty to disclose material nonpublic information upon a person
who is not a corporate insider.'
15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(11l) (1976).
2 See generally HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTOR PRO-
TECTION IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1655, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 House Rep.]; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, ADDI-
TIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION IN CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP, S. Rep. No. 1125, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Rep.]; An Act to Amend Sections
13(d), 13(c), 14(d) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 In order to Provide Addi-
tional Consumer Protection for Investors: Hearings on S. 3431 Before the Subcom. on Com-
merce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 House Hearings]; A Bill to Extend the Coverage of
Sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in Order to Provide
Additional Protection for Investors: Hearing on S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited
as 1970 Senate Hearings]; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. Rep.
No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 House Rep.]; SENATE COMM.
ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND IN COR-
PORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as
1967 Senate Rep.]; Bills Providing for Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership of
Securities Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings].
A tender offer is a method of corporate takeover in which a bidder offers to purchase
shares of a target corporation at a premium price provided the target's shareholders 'Sell a
specified number of shares. 1968 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 11 (statement of Manuel
F. Cohen, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). Target shareholders wishing to
sell shares to a bidder making a tender offer tender their shares to an agent specified by the
bidder. Id. The bidder sets a time period within which target shareholders must tender their
shares. Id. If sufficient shares are tendered, the bidder must purchase the shares at the
tender offer price. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c)(3) (1981). If insufficient shares are tendered,
the bidder must either extend the tender offer period or return the shares to their owners.
1968 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 11; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(c)(3) (1981).
1 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1981).
Id.; 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 (1981).
I Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1980); Feldman v.
Simkins Indus., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 844-45 (N.D. Ca. 1980); see text accompanying notes
17-20 infra.
6 See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 (1980) (rule 14e-3 applicable to any person). Rule
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Rule 14e-3 contains four parts. First, rule 14e-3(a) requires any per-
son in possession of material nonpublic information concerning a tender
offer to disclose the information or to abstain from trading in the
securities involved in the tender offer Second, rule 14e-3(b) provides an
exception to rule 14e-3(a) for multi-service financial institutions Third,
14e-3(a) has several elements. First, a bidder must commence or take substantial steps to
commence a tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1981); see 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413
(1980). A bidder commences a tender offer when he first communicates the tender offer to
the target shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1981); see SEC Rel. No. 34-16623 (March 5,
1980). A bidder takes a substantial step to commence a tender offer when he forms a plan to
make a tender offer, prepares tender offer materials, or takes any other significant action
toward commencing a tender offer. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,413 n.33; 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,353
n.33 (1979). The second element of rule 14e-3(a) is that a person other than the bidder ac-
quire material information concerning a tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1981); see 45
Fed. Reg. at 60,413. Material information concerning a tender offer includes, but is not
limited to, a bidder's intent to make or withdraw from a tender offer or to increase the con-
sideration for tendered shares. 45 Fed. Reg. at 70,413 n.35. Rule 14e-3(a) also requires that the
person in possession of material information regarding a tender offer know or have reason
to know that the information is nonpublic. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a); see 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,413
& n.36. The final element of rule 14e-3(a) is that the person in possession of material non-
public information relating to a tender offer know or have reason to know that he acquired
the information either directly or indirectly from the bidder or target. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3(a); see 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,413 n.37. Thus, rule 14e-3(a) prohibits a person from
trading in securities involved in a tender offer based upon material nonpublic information
obtained through misappropriation or from conversations with a bidder, target, or agent of
a bidder or target. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,413 n.37. Rule 14e-3(a) does not prohibit trading pur-
suant to market rumors concerning a tender offer. Id.; see 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,353 (commen-
tators fear that rule 14e-3(a) prohibits trading on market rumor information). Rule 14e-3(a)
applies both before and after commencement of a tender offer until the tender offer expires
or disclosure is properly made. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,413 n.33, 60,414.
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1981). The disclosure requirement of rule 14e-3(a) has two
elements. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a). First, a person coming within the scope of rule
14e-3(a) must disclose his material nonpublic information within a reasonable time before
trading in the securities involved in the tender offer. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,414. Second, the
disclosure must include the source of the information and be made by press release or other
appropriate method. Id. A person in possession of material nonpublic information relating to
a tender offer is relieved of the duty to disclose if another person discloses the information
in conformity with rule 14e-3(a). Id.
8 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b) (1981). Rule 14e-3(a) applies to "any person." 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3(a) (1981). A multi-service financial institution is a legal person other than a natural
person that provides many financial services. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(9) (definition of "per-
son" under '34 Act); 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,415 (1980). Absent rule 14e-3(b) a multi-service
financial institution would violate rule 14e-3(a) if one department of the institution possess-
ed material nonpublic information concerning a tender offer, while another department
traded in the target securities without knowing the information. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,414
(1980). Thus, rule 14e-3(b) limits the liability of a multi-service financial institution under
rule 14e-3(a) to situations involving actual misuse of information. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,414.
The exception to rule 14e-3(a) provided in rule 14e-3(b) has two requirements. First, an
institution must prove that the individual who traded in securities involved in a tender offer
did not have possession of material nonpublic information concerning the tender offer. Id. at
60,415; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b)(1). Second, the institution must prove the existence of
reasonable internal procedures to ensure that persons making investment decisions within
the institution could not violate rule 14e-3(a). 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,415; see 17 C.F.R. §
RULE 14e-3
rule 14e-3(c) allows exceptions to rule 14e-3(a) for persons acting on
behalf of a bidder, and for persons selling securities to a bidder.' Finally,
rule 14e-3(d) prohibits the communication of material nonpublic informa-
tion relating to a tender offer when violation of rule 14e-3(a) is
foreseeable."0 The SEC considers such communications as constituting
misuse of material nonpublic information." Thus, rule 14e-3(a) contains
the central disclosure requirement of rule 14e-3, while subsections (b), (c)
and (d) provide exceptions designed to ensure that rule 14e-3 regulates
only actual misuse of material nonpublic information concerning a tender
offer."
Section 14(e) of the '34 Act applies solely to fraud in the sale of
securities involved in a tender offer." Before promulgation of rule 14e-3,
240.14e-3(b)(2). Reasonable procedures include, but are not limited to, Chinese walls and
restricted lists. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,415; see 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-3(b)(2)(i) & (ii). A Chinese
wall is a procedure that prohibits the flow of confidential information between departments
in a multi-departmental business. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,451; cf. The Future of the Chinese Wall
Defense to Vicarious Disqualification of a Former Government Attorney's Law Firm, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151 (1981). A restricted list is a list of corporations that have given
material, nonpublic information to an institution. Id. An institution can prevent misuse of
the information by prohibiting employees from either rendering services relating to the
securities or trading in securities of corporations on the list. Id.
" See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(c) (1981). Rule 14e-3(c)(1) permits a broker or agent of a bid-
der to trade in target securities on behalf of the bidder. Id. Rule 14e-3(c)(1) is necessary
because absent the exception, rule 14e-3(a would preclude a bidder's broker or agent from
trading in target securities if the bidder revealed to his broker or agent an intent to make a
tender offer. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,416 (1980). Although rule 14e-3(c)(1) allows a bidder's
broker or agent to purchase target securities for the bidder, a bidder's broker or agent
would violate rule 14e-3(a) if he traded in the target securities for personal benefit. Id.; see
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(c)(1).
Rule 14e-3(c)(2) places persons selling target securites to the bidder outside the scope
of rule 14e-3(a). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(2). The rule 14e-3(c)(2) exception allows a target secur-
ity holder who has material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to sell the
target securities to the bidder before the bidder commences the tender offer. 45 Fed. Reg.
at 60,416; see text accompanying note 11 supra.
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (1981). Rule 14e-3(d) applies to two groups of persons. See id.;
45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,417 (1980). The first group consists of bidders, targets, or persons
acting on behalf of bidders or targets. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)(2}(i)-(iii). The second group
consists of persons who receive information from the first group. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3(d)(2(iv). Members of either group violate rule 14e-3 if they communicate material
nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to another person when violation of rule
14e-3a) is reasonably foreseeable. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d)(1).
Subsections (i)-(iii) of rule 14e-3(d)(1) provide an exception to rule 14e-3(d) for good faith
communications to persons involved in planning, financing, preparing, or executing a tender
offer, or to any person communicating information concerning a tender offer pursuant to
law. Id. A person who communicates material nonpublic information relating to a tender of-
fer does not communicate in good faith if he knows or has reason to know that the com-
munication will result in violation of rule 14e-3. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,417. The exception does
not affect the potential rule 14e-3 liability of the recipient of the information. Id.
"1 See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,417 (1980).
" See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981); 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,414 (1980).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1976).
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the SEC regulated insider trading through section 10(b) of the '34 Act14
and rule 10b-5." Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit fraudulent,
manipulative, or deceptive acts in connection with the sale of any secur-
ity."6 Under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, a corporate insider owes a
fiduciary duty to both buyers and sellers of his corporation's securities. 7
The duty arises from a corporate insider's obligation to conduct the
business affairs of his corporation for the benefit of all shareholders.18
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit a corporate insider from taking ad-
vantage of access to confidential corporate information for personal gain
at the shareholders' expense. 9 Thus, a corporate insider is guilty of
fraud under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 if he purchases or sells shares of
his corporation based on inside information that the shares' value will
soon increase or decrease.2
In Chiarella v. United States," the Supreme Court considered
whether section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit a person who is not a cor-
porate insider from trading in securities involved in a tender offer
without first publicly disclosing his material nonpublic information con-
cerning the tender offer." Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer,
discovered the identity of several tender offer targets., Chiarella traded
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); see text accompanying note 21 infra.
1' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); text accompanying note 21 infra.
1, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) prohibits any person
from employing any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security. 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (1976). Rule 10b-5 prohibits in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of a security any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or any act, practice, or
course of business which would defraud any person. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5
also prohibits any person from making, in connection with the sale or purchase of any
security, an untrue statement of material fact, or from omitting a material fact necessary to
make statements made not misleading. Id.
" See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 883, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
Is Id.
,9 SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 652 n.23 (9th Cir. 1980); Walton v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 482 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 742 n.45 (E.D. Va.
1980); Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 844-45 (N.D. Ca. 1980).
" See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 911 (1961).
21 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
See id. at 224-26.
Id. at 224. Chiarella was an employee of Pandick Press, a New York based financial
printing company. Id. Through his position, Chiarella learned the identities of four tender
offer targets and one merger candidate. Id. at n.1. Without disclosing his knowledge of the
forthcoming takeovers, Chiarella purchased securities in the target companies. Id. at 224.
After the bidders publicly announced the takeover attempts, Chiarella sold his interests in
the targets and realized a $30,000 profit. Id. The SEC investigated Chiarella's trading and in
May 1977, Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC which required Chiarella to
return the profits from his transactions. Id. In January of 1978, Chiarella was indicted on 17
counts of violating § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. He was convicted on all counts. 450 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd 558 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
RULE 14e-3
profitably in the target securities without disclosing his knowledge of
the pending takeovers. 4 Following an SEC investigation into Chiarella's
trading activities, Chiarella was indicted for violations of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5.1 The Supreme Court held that section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 require only a corporate insider to disclose his material nonpublic
information concerning a tender offer before trading in target securi-
ties."6 The Court found that Chiarella was not a corporate insider
because Chiarella was not in a relationship of trust toward the parties to
his market transactions. ' Therefore, the Court held that Chiarella did
not violate section 10(b) or rule 10b-5.
28
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the SEC proposed
rule 14e-3 to require a person who is not a corporate insider to disclose
his material, nonpublic information concerning a tender offer before
trading in the target securities.' The SEC understood that the Supreme
Court's decision in Chiarella could affect the validity of rule 14e-3.11 The
Commission recognized that rule 14e-3 would be superfluous if the Court
held that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 required Chiarella to disclose his
nonpublic information despite the absence of a fiduciary duty.2 ' Such a
holding in Chiarella would have established a disclosure duty under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 applicable to all tender offer transactions within
the scope of rule 14e-3.12 The SEC also recognized that if Chiarella re-
24 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
,1 Id.; see text accompanying note 23 supra.
" Id. at 232-33. The Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella that § 10(b) and rule 10b-5
imposes a duty to disclose material nonpublic information before trading only upon cor-
porate insiders is well founded. In Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., the
Second Circuit held that liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 for failing to disclose material
nonpublic information can arise only where a duty to disclose exists. 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d
Cir. 1975). The court held that parties who were not corporate insiders did not violate §
10(b) and rule 10b-5 when they did not disclose lawfully obtained material nonpublic infor-
mation, because the parties did not have a duty to disclose the information. Id. Similarly,
the Second Circuit held in General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., that a person who is
not a corporate insider does not have a duty to disclose material information to a seller
before purchasing the seller's shares. 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968). Thus, Frigitemp and
General Time indicate that liability under § 10b and rule 10b-5 for failure to disclose
material nonpublic information requires a duty to disclose the information. See Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980).
2' 445 U.S. 222, 231, 235 (1980).
23 Id.
I See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,411 n.2 (1980). The SEC first proposed rule 14e-2(c) to
prohibit a person who is not a corporate insider from trading in securities involved in a
tender offer without disclosing his material nonpublic information. See id.; 44 Fed. Reg.
9956 (1979). Rule 14e-3 evolved from amendments to rule 14e-2(c). 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,411; see
44 Fed. Reg. 70,349,70,352-55 (discussion of amendments to proposed rule 14e-2(c)). The SEC
amended and adopted rule 14e-3, on October 14, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,410. The Supreme
Court decided Chiarella on March 18, 1980. 445 U.S. 222, 222 (1980).
See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,411 (1980).
3, See id.
See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 (1980); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. §§
240.14e-3, 240.10b-5 (1981).
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quired only corporate insiders to disclose material, nonpublic informa-
tion, doubts concerning the Commission's authority to promulgate rule
14e-3 would arise.3 Although the Chiarella Court held that only a cor-
porate insider has a duty to disclose certain information before trading
in securities, the SEC maintains that Chiarella does not preclude pro-
mulgation of rule 14e-3. 4 The Commission asserts that since Chiarella
concerned violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, Chiarella does not
limit SEC rulemaking authority under section 14(e)." While the Chiarella
Court did not expressly limit SEC rulemaking authority under section
14(e), careful examination of the Chiarella rationale and the statutory
language and legislative history of section 14(e) raises several questions
concerning the applicability of rule 14e-3 to a person who is not a cor-
porate insider."
In Chiarella, the Supreme Court reasoned that the statutory
language and legislative history of section 10(b) demonstrates that Con-
gress did not intend section 10(b) to create a duty requiring a person
other than a corporate insider to disclose his material nonpublic informa-
tion before making a market transaction. The Court held that the SEC
could not create such a duty under rule 10b-5 because the rule would ex-
ceed the intended scope of section 10(b) of the '34 Act. 8 Sections 10(b)
and 14(e) of the '34 Act employ similar terms to prohibit fraudulent
securities transactions.3 9 Therefore, according to the Court's reasoning
in Chiarella, the application of rule 14e-3 to a person who is not a cor-
porate insider is valid only if Congress intended section 14(e) to impose a
disclosure duty upon persons who are outside a fiduciary relationship."
Examination of the language of section 14(e) is the initial step in
determining whether Congress intended section 14(e) to require a person
who is not a corporate insider to disclose his material, nonpublic informa-
l See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,411-13 (1980) (SEC position that Chiarella does not
preclude promulgation of rule 14e-3).
s' See id. at 60,412.
See id.
38 See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,411-13 (1980).
445 U.S. 222, 226, 233 (1980).
a'Id.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
40 Cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980). In Aaron, the Supreme Court considered
the scope of the rulemaking power of the SEC under § 10(b). Id. at 690. The Aaron Court
held that the scope of rule lOb-5 cannot exceed the scope of § 10(b). Id. at 691. Thus, the
Court ruled that liability under rule 10b-5 requires scienter because liability under § 10(b)
requires scienter. Id. In reaching its decision in Aaron, the Supreme Court relied upon
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. See id. at 690-91. The Hochfelder Court found that the
rulemaking power granted to the SEC is not the power to create law. Id. at 213. The Court
reasoned that the SEC has rulemaking power only to the extent that the rules give effect to
the intent of Congress as expressed by statute. Id. at 241; see Dixon v. United States, 381
U.S. 68, 74 (1965) (I.R.S. rulemaking authority limited to scope of Internal Revenue Code);
Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (regulations exceeding
statutory authority are void).
RULE 14e-3
tion before trading in securities involved in a tender offer.41 The
operative language of section 14(e) is nearly identical to the language of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.42 Section 14(e) prohibits any person from
making misstatements of material fact or engaging in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative act in connection with a tender offer." Alter-
natively, section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit any person from employing
any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the sale of a
security." Based on the similarity in language of sections 10(b) and 14(e)
and rule 10-5, courts have ruled uniformly that the duties imposed under
rule 10b-5 and sections 10(b) and 14(e) are identical.4 5 In Chiarella, the
Supreme Court held that the language of section 10(b) does not impose a
' See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980) (initial step in determining scope of §
10(b) is examination of § 10(b) statutory language); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
226 (1980) (statutory language defines scope of § 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 212 (1976) (statutory language and legislative history indicate scope of § 10(b)).
Although no court has considered whether § 14(e) extends a duty to disclose material non-
public information to a person who is not a corporate insider, the weight of authority shows
that resolution of the issue depends on examination of the statutory language and
legislative history of § 14(e). See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977)
(language and legislative history reveal scope of § 14(e)); Crane v. American Standard, Inc.,
603 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1979) (statutory language and legislative history indicate § 14(e)
does not imply private cause of action); Stargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 705, 769 (5th Cir.
1974) (legislative history shows "security holders" have a private cause of action under §
14(e)); H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1973) (statutory
scheme and legislative history indicate purpose of § 14(e) is shareholder protection).
," Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981) with 15 U.S.C. §
78n(e) (1976).
"s 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
'" See, e.g., Crane v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1979); Herbst
v. ITT Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1313 n.11 (2d Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579, 605 (5th Cir. 1974); H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 426 (1st
Cir. 1973); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 361 (2d Cir. 1973);
Electronic Speciality Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1969). In Crane,
the Second Circuit compared shareholder rights under rule 10b-5, § 10(b) and § 14(e). Id. at
249. Observing that the language of § 14(e) and rule 10b-5 are nearly identical, the Court
held that the primary difference in the scope of the sections is that rule 10b-5 applies to any
sale or purchase of any security, while § 14(e) applies only to tender offers. Id. In Herbst,
the Second Circuit also ruled that the principles embodied in rule 10b-5 and § 14(e) are iden-
tical. 495 F.2d at 1313 n.11. In Smallwood, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress intended §
14(e) to create duties identical to those imposed under rule 10b-5. 489 F.2d at 605. The
Smallwood court held that when Congress drafted § 14(e) with language similar to rule
10b-5, Congress intended the law concerning rule 10b-5 to apply to § 14(e). Id. Thus, the
Fifth Circuit held that once standing is established in a § 14(e) action, analysis under rule
10b-5 and § 14(e) is identical. Id. In H.K. Porter Co., Inc., the First Circuit held that the dif-
ference between § 14(e) and rule 10b-5 is that § 14(e) provides broader standing re-
quirements than § 10(b). 482 F.2d at 424. In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. and Electronic
Speciality Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., the Second Circuit held that with the exception of
loosening standing requirements, the major impact of § 14(e) was to codify under § 14(e) the
law relating to § 10(b). See Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 361 (2d
Cir. 1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940. (2d Cir. 1969).
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duty to disclose material, nonpublic information upon persons not in a
fiduciary relationship. Therefore, the language of section 14(e) indicates
that section 14(e) should apply only to a person in a fiduciary relation-
ship.47
Since the statutory language of section 14(e) does not explicitly
justify the scope of rule 14e-3, examination of the legislative history of
section 14(e) is necessary. 8 Congress enacted section 14(e) in 1968
through the Williams Act, which amended the '34 Act to impose disclo-
sure and antifraud requirements upon a bidder making a tender offer. 9
In 1970, Congress amended the Williams Act to grant the SEC rulemak-
ing authority under section 14(e)." Thus, the legislative history to both
the Williams Act and the 1970 amendments provide insight concerning
whether Congress intended section 14(e) to grant the SEC authority to
institute a disclosure duty as broad as the duty that the SEC seeks to im-
pose under rule 14e-3. 1
The 1967 Senate and 1968 House reports concerning the Williams
Act reveal that Congress enacted the Williams Act to prevent fraudu-
lent tender offers through the imposition of disclosure requirements
upon bidders. 2 While the 1968 congressional reports emphasize the need
for a bidder to disclose to target shareholders material information con-
's 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
17 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
" See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); text accompanying note 81
supra.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78(1l)-(n) (1934), as amended by, Pub. L. No. 91-439, §§ (1)-(2), 84 Stat.
1497 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)-(n) (1976)).
0 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(1)-(n) (1934), as amended by, Pub. L. No. 91-567 §§ (1)-(2), 84 Stat.
1497 (1970) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)-(n) (1976)).
" See text accompanying note 41 supra.
2 See 1967 Senate Rep., supra note 2, at 4; 1968 House Rep., supra note 2, at 2-3. Con-
gress enacted the Williams Act because tender offers had become an increasingly common
method of corporate takeover. See 1967 Senate Rep., supra note 2, at 2; 1968 House Rep.,
supra note 2, at 2. Tender offers had become popular because they allowed bidders to engage
in corporate takeovers without disclosing to target shareholders any facts relevant to the
takeover. See 1967 Senate Rep., supra note 2, at 2; 1968 House Rep., supra note 2, at 2.
Thus, Congress enacted the Williams Act to require a bidder making a tender offer to
disclose to the target shareholders material information concerning the tender offer. See
1967 Senate Rep., supra note 2, at 2-3; 1968 House Rep., supra note 2, at 2.
The Williams Act requires a bidder making a tender offer to file with the SEC a state-
ment indicating the background and identity of all bidders in the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(1)
(1934), as amended by Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 78(d)(1) (1976)). Under the Act, a bidder must disclose to the SEC the financing ar-
rangements for the tender offer, the bidder's plans for the target after takeover, and the
number of target shares in the bidder's possession. Id. A bidder also must disclose any
outstanding obligations of the bidder relating to the target shares. Id. Since the focus of the
Williams Act is on a bidder's duty to target shareholders, the § 14(e) antifraud provision
should be considered as referring to a bidder unless the legislative history of § 14(e) indi-
cates an intent to expand the scope of the section to include a person who is not a corporate
insider. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
8 RULE 14e-3
cerning a tender offer, the reports' commentary on section 14(e) does not
mention a duty to disclose material, nonpublic information applicable to
persons other than those making or opposing a tender offer.' Therefore,
the 1967 Senate and 1968 House reports pertaining to the Williams Act
do not indicate congressional intent to create a disclosure duty appli-
cable to persons not in a fiduciary relationship. 4
The 1967 Senate and the 1968 House hearings concerning the Will-
iams Act also indicate that Congress enacted the Williams Act to pro-
hibit bidders, rather than persons outside a fiduciary relationship, from
engaging in fraudulent tender offers." The section-by-section analysis of
the Williams Act appearing in the 1967 Senate hearings states that sec-
tion 14(e) prohibits a person making or opposing a tender offer from com-
mitting fraudulent acts in connection with the tender offer.5 Senator
Thomas Kuchel, co-sponsor of the Williams Act, reported that the
Williams Act was designed to prohibit a bidder from taking control of
the target without first disclosing material information concerning the
tender offer to the target shareholders. The Chairman of the SEC, 8 the
President of the American Stock Exchange, 9 and a Vice President of the
New York Stock Exchange" agreed with Senator Kuchel. Several legal
scholars also expressed the view that the drafters of the Williams Act in-
tended to impose a disclosure duty upon a bidder." Thus, the 1967
' See 1967 Senate Rep., supra note 2, at 11 (§ 14(e) applies to person making, opposing,
or seeking to influence tender offer); 1968 House Rep., supra note 2, at 6 (§ 14(e) applies to
persons making or opposing tender offer).
" See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
" See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 1-3 (statement of Senator Harrison A.
Williams) (Williams Act requires bidder to disclose material facts when making tender
offer); 1968 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 1 (statement of Congressman John E. Moss)
(Williams Act requires bidddr to disclose material facts connected with tender offer).
1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 14.
', 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of Senator Thomas H. Kuchel).
1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen). The SEC
Chairman stated that imposing disclosure requirements upon a bidder allows target
shareholders to make an informed judgment regarding the effects of a change in the
target's management. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 18 (statement of Manuel F.
Cohen). One advantage resulting from bidder disclosure is protection of target shareholders
from making a hasty decision to sell when bidder disclosure might reveal the possibility of a
better offer. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen).
11 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (statement of Ralph S. Saul).
10 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2 at 70 (statement of Donald L. Calvin).
", See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 129 (statement of Arthur Fleischer, Jr.)
(proposed Williams Act applies to bidders, but requires excessive bidder disclosure); 1967
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 136 (statement of Stanley A. Kaplan) (proposed Williams
Act requires unnecessary bidder disclosure); 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 139
(statement of William H. Painter). Painter testified that the broad issue concerning the pro-
posed Williams Act was determining when a bidder has a duty to disclose inside informa-
tion. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 143 (statement of William H. Painter). Painter
stated that § 10(b) and § 14(e) have similar language and that the proposed Williams Act did
not indicate a difference in the application of the two sections. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra
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Senate and 1968 House hearings indicate that the primary thrust of the
Williams Act is the prevention of fraud by a bidder making a tender of-
fer.
62
Although the Senate and House hearings demonstrate that the Will-
iams Act regulates bidders, the hearings also contain evidence that Con-
gress intended section 14(e) to require any person in possession of
material nonpublic information concerning a tender offer to disclose the
information before trading in target securities. 3 Congressman John
Moss stated that the purpose of the Williams Act is to provide share-
holders with the information necessary to make an informed investment
decision regarding a tender offer.64 A Vice President of the New York
Stock Exchange testified that a primary concern of the Williams Act is
elimination of adverse market effects resulting from trading in securi-
ties without disclosing material nonpublic information. 5 The Chairman
of the SEC testified that a major misconception concerning the Williams
Act was that the sole purpose of the Act is the prevention of fraud by
parties making or opposing a tender offer." If the scope of the Williams
Act is not limited to preventing fraud by persons making or opposing a
tender offer, then section 14(e) might justify a rule requiring a person
who is not in a fiduciary relationship to disclose his material nonpublic
information concerning a tender offer before trading in target
securities. The Senate and House hearings, however, do not explicitly
reveal congressional intent that section 14(e) broaden the duty to
disclose under the '34 Act beyond the duty imposed under section 10(b). 68
note 2, at 140 (statement of William H. Painter). Painter concluded that if Congress desired
to create special protections for target shareholders, the protection should be implemented
by amending § 10(b), not § 14(e). 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 142 (statement of
William H. Painter).
62 See text accompanying notes 55-61 supra.
See text accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
1968 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of John E. Moss).
1968 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 43 (statement of Donald L. Calvin). Calvin at-
tacked a section of the proposed Williams Act that would have required a bidder to file with
the SEC a statement of intention to make a tender offer five days before commencing the
tender offer. Id. Calvin opposed the rule because the rule would promote leaks of material,
nonpublic information concerning a tender offer. Id. at 44. Calvin testified that when
material, nonpublic information relating to a bidder's intent to commence a tender offer
leaks into the securities market, the market price of the target securities increases to the
tender offer price. Id. When the market price reaches the tender offer price, bidders may be
forced to abandon their tender offers, thus harming target shareholders who would have
tendered their shares. Id. Since Calvin directed his remarks toward the market effects of
trading absent public disclosure of material nonpublic information, Calvin implicitly sup-
ported requiring a person who is not a corporate insider to abstain from trading in
securities without first disclosing the material nonpublic information. See id. Calvin gave
similar testimony in the 1967 Senate Hearings. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at
69-76 (statement of Donald L. Calvin).
1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 205 (statement of Manuel F. Cohen).
07 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
See text accompanying notes 52-67 supra.
RULE 14e-3
The legislative history of the 1970 amendment to rule 14(e) contains
little evidence that Congress intended to grant the SEC the power to
regulate the disclosure duty of a person not in a fiduciary relationship. 9
The Senate and House reports concerning the amendment to section
14(e) indicate instead that Congress intended to grant the SEC rulemak-
ing power to regulate sophisticated schemes and devices used by bid-
ders and targets in a tender offer."° The reports do not mention an intent
to regulate trading upon material, nonpublic information."1 The 1970
Senate and House hearings also indicate that Congress granted the SEC
rulemaking power under section 14(e) to regulate bidder and target
fraud. 2 Thus, the legislative history emphasizes that Congress intended
the 1970 amendment to section 14(e) to allow regulation of bidders and
targets, not corporate outsiders."
The 1970 Senate hearings, however, do provide some evidence that
Congress amended section 14(e) to allow the SEC to prohibit all trading
in securities involved in a tender offer absent disclosure of material non-
public information. 4 During the hearings, Senator Williams asked the
SEC Chairman for examples of practices that rules promulgated under
section 14(e) would prohibit. 5 The Chairman responded that the rules
would prohibit a person aware of a pending tender offer from trading in
the target securities without first publicly disclosing that the target was
a tender offer candidate." The SEC Chairman did not indicate whether
the rule would apply to all persons gaining possession of material, non-
public information relating to a tender offer or whether the rule would
I See text accompanying notes 70-73 infra; text accompanying note 45 supra. But see
text accompanying notes 74-78 infra.
70 See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 36 (statement of SEC Chairman Hamer
H. Budge); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 21 (statement of SEC Chairman Hamer H.
Budge); 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 2 (statement of Harrison A. Williams).
The 1967 Senate hearings provide examples of fraudulent practices that targets employ in
contested tender offers. Professor Stanley A. Kaplan testified that target managements will
often issue a public statement that the tender offer price is too low, and then propose a divi-
dend increase. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of Stanley A.
Kaplan). Target managements also often attempt to defeat a tender offer through the insti-
tution of litigation based upon questionable claims against the bidder. See id. In response to
Professor Kaplan's remarks, Professor Robert H. Mundheim remarked that § 14(e) would
prohibit such practices. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of Robert H.
Mundheim).
7, See 1970 Senate Rep., supra note 2, at 6; 1970 House Report, supra note 2, at 21.
See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 36 (statement of SEC Chairman Hamer
H. Budge); 1970 House Hearings, supra note 2 at 21 (statement of SEC Chairman Hamer H.
Budge).
" See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
7 See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
7 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 11 (statement of Senator Harrison A.
Williams).
76 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 12 (statement of SEC Chairman Hamer H.
Budge).
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be limited to persons involved in making or opposing the tender offer.7
Nonetheless, the Chairman's testimony in the 1970 Senate hearings is
the best indication that the applicability of rule 14e-3 to a person who is
not a corporate insider is within the scope of section 14(e).
78
Even if rule 14e-3 as interpreted by the SEC is within the scope of
section 14(e), the potential impact of rule 14e-3 is difficult to assess.
Federal courts have not decided any cases involving alleged violation of
rule 14e-3. In Feldman v. Simkins Industries, Inc.," and Walton v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.,8 however, two federal courts considered the
effect of Chiarella upon the issue whether a person who is not a cor-
porate insider has a duty to disclose material nonpublic information con-
cerning a tender offer before trading in target securities.8 Although the
courts decided the cases before promulgation of rule 14e-3, 1 analysis of
Feldman and Morgan Stanley provides insight into the possible impact
of rule 14e-3.83
In Feldman, Louisiana-Pacific Corporation made a tender offer for
shares of Fibreboard Corporation. 4 One of the conditions of the tender
'7 See id. Chairman Budge responded by memorandum to Senator Williams' request
for examples of the activities that the SEC would prohibit through rules promulgated under
§ 14(e). See MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, reprinted in 1970
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 12 [hereinafter cited as SEC Memorandum]. The
memorandum cited seven fraudulent acts that rules promulgated under § 14(e) would pro-
hibit. See SEC Memorandum, reprinted in 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 12. Of the
seven fraudulent acts cited, six specifically involved actions by bidders and targets. See id.
The only act cited that did not apply to a bidder or target applied to "[tihe person who has
become aware that a tender bid is to be made." Id. Although the plain meaning of the
quoted language indicates applicability to any person, the language arguably applies only to
agents of a bidder or target. See text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
78 See text accompanying note 76 supra.
" 492 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ca. 1980).
" 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
" See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796, 799 n.6 (2d Cir. 1980) (under
Chiarella, duty to disclose or abstain from trading requires fiduciary relationship); Feldman
v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 844 (N.D. Ca. 1980) (under Chiarella, insiders are
officers, directors, majority shareholders, or persons in relationship of trust).
82 See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir., June 4, 1980)
(breach of fiduciary duty requires fiduciary relationship); Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc.,
492 F. Supp. 839, 845 (N.D. Ca., June 19, 1980) (duty to disclose material nonpublic informa-
tion requires fiduciary relationship).
' See text accompanying notes 84-128 infra.
" 492 F. Supp. at 842. The Feldman court referred to Louisiana-Pacific's takeover at-
tempt to Fibreboard as a cash sale merger offer. Id. The cash sale merger offer appears to
have been a tender offer. Although the Williams Act requires a bidder to disclose to the
SEC certain information relating to a tender offer, the Act does not define tender offer. See
15 U.S.C. § 78(l)-(n) (1976). The SEC, however, has proposed a rule defining tender offer. See
44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,349-52 (1979). Under the proposed rule, an offer to purchase
securities is a tender offer if either of two tests are met. Id. The first test has four elements.
First, there must be one or more offers to purchase shares of one class. Id. Second, the of-
fers must be within a 45 day period. Id. Third, the offer must be directed toward more than
10 persons. Id. Fourth, the bidder must be seeking more than 5% of the class of securities.
Id.
The second test of the proposed rule defining tender offer has three elements. supra
RULE 14e-3
offer was that Leon Simkins and two other major Fibreboard share-
holders tender their shares to Louisiana-Pacific for $15 per share. 5
Although Simkins made repeated public announcements that he would
not sell his Fibreboard shares for $15 per share, Simkins sold his shares
for an average price of more than $16 per share without making a public
announcement of the sale. Feldman, a former Fibreboard shareholder,
charged that Simkins' sale of Fibreboard securities violated section 10(b)
of the '34 Act and rule 10b-5.8 Feldman alleged that Simkins' sale of
Fibreboard securities constituted material nonpublic information
concerning a tender offer,88 and that Simkins was a corporate insider
having duty to disclose publicly his intention to sell his Fibreboard
shares before selling them. 9 Alternatively, Feldman charged that
Simkins had a duty to disclose his intention to sell his interest in
Fibreboard even if Simkins was not a corporate insider."
Based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the Northern
District of California determined that Simkins was not a corporate in-
sider because Simkins was not an officer, director, controlling share-
holder, or person in a relationship of trust or confidence with Fibreboard
shareholders. 1 The Feldman court ruled that even if Simkins' intention
to sell Fibreboard shares constituted material nonpublic information,
Simkins had no duty to disclose his intention to sell his interest in
Fibreboard.2 The court found that under the Chiarella rationale, a duty
70,351. First, the offer must be made in a widespread manner. Id. Second, the offer price
must exceed either 5% of the market price, or exceed the market price by. $2 per share.
Finally, the offers cannot allow an opportunity to negotiate the offered price. Id.
The cash sale merger offer in Feldman meets the first test of the proposed SEC defini-
tion of tender offer. Louisiana-Pacific made an offer to purchase shares of common stock of
Fibreboard. Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 492 F. Supp. 839, 842 (N.D. Ca. 1980). Since
Louisiana-Pacific made only one offer involving Simkins' Fibreboard shares, the require-
ment that the offers be within a 45 day period was irrelevant. See 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,350
n.10. The three major shareholders of Fibreboard owned 1,037,200 shares, which constituted
only 31% of the outstanding Fibreboard shares. 492 F. Supp. at 842. Thus, although not
stated in the decision, the Louisiana-Pacific offer apparently extended to more than 10
Fibreboard shareholders. See id. Finally, Louisiana-Pacific sought more than 5o of the
Fibreboard shares by requiring the three major Fibreboard shareholders to sell their in-
terests in Fibreboard. Id. The Louisiana-Pacific offer would not have met the second of the
proposed definitions of tender offer because Louisiana-Pacific negotiated the price of the of-
fer with the Fibreboard management. See id.; 44 Fed. Reg. at 70,351.






Id. at 844-45. In Feldman, the plaintiff argued that if investors had known that
Simkins was selling 400,000 shares of Fibreboard, that knowledge might have influenced
their investment decisions. Id. at 844 n.3. The plaintiff argued further that the sale of large
blocks of Fibreboard shares could have affected prospective shareholders' opinions concern-
ing whether Fibreboard would merge with Louisiana-Pacific. Id. at 844. For purposes of its
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to disclose material nonpublic information before trading applies only to
a corporate insider. 3
Applying rule 14e-3 to the facts in Feldman would not have imposed
a duty upon Simkins to disclose or abstain from trading.' Rule 14e-3 im-
poses that duty upon a person who is not a corporate insider only when
the person acquires material, nonpublic information concerning a tender
offer from a bidder, target, or agent of a bidder or target. 5 Simkins'
material, nonpublic information was the personal knowledge that he was
selling his interest in Fibreboard. 8 Since Simkins did not acquire that in-
formation from bidder Louisiana-Pacific, target Fibreboard or from an
agent of the bidder or target, rule 14e-3 would not have required
Simkins to disclose his intention to sell his interest in Fibreboard before
selling his shares. 7 Thus, applying rule 14e-3 to the Feldman facts indi-
cates that rule 14e-3 preserves a shareholder's ability to trade securities
upon nonpublic information concerning his personal market trans-
actions.98
Although rule 14e-3 would not have altered the result in Feldman,
rule 14e-3 might have changed the outcome in Walton v. Morgan Stanley
& Co., Inc.9 In Morgan Stanley, Kennecott Corporation hired Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc. to find a company that Kennecott could acquire."'
Morgan Stanley, a multi-service financial institution specializing in in-
vestment advice,' suggested Olinkraft as a merger candidate for Ken-
necott. °' Olinkraft favored a merger with Kennecott 3 and gave Morgan
Stanley's Mergers and Acquisitions Department material, nonpublic in-
formation pertaining to projected Olinkraft earnings.' 4 Olinkraft warned
Morgan Stanley's Mergers and Acquisitions Department that the infor-
mation was to be used only for securing a Kennecott bid for Olinkraft
securities.'"9 Although Kennecott decided not to bid for Olinkraft, Texas
decision, the district court assumed without deciding that Simkins' sale of large blocks of
Fibreboard shares constituted material nonpublic information. Id. at 844 & n.3, 845.
'3 Id. at 845.
84 See text accompanying notes 95-98 infra.
" See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1981).
See Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 859, 844 & n.3 (N.D. Ca. 1980);
text accompanying note 91 supra.
8" See Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 843-44 (N.D. Ca. 1980)
(Simkins created material nonpublic information); 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,410 (1980); 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981); text accompanying note 6 supra (rule 14e-3 requires acquisition of
material nonpublic information from bidder, target, or agent of bidder or target).
98 See text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980); see text accompanying notes 100-103 infra.
10 623 F.2d at 797.
101 See id.; text accompanying note 8 supra (definition of multi-service financial institu-
tion).






Eastern Corporation made a tender offer to purchase Olinkraft shares
for $51 per share."' After announcement of the Texas Eastern tender of-
fer, Morgan Stanley's Arbitrage Department purchased 149,200 shares
of Olinkraft for Morgan Stanley's benefit upon the belief that an offer for
Olinkraft at greater than $51 per share would be forthcoming."7
Although the Mergers and Acquisitions Department knew of the Arbi-
trage Department's Olinkraft purchases, the Mergers and Acquisitions
Department disclosed the confidential Olinkraft earnings projections to
Johns-Manville to convince Johns-Manville to make a tender offer for
Olinkraft.'0 8 Johns-Manville and Texas Eastern entered into a bidding
war for Olinkraft, and Johns-Manville ultimately purchased Olinkraft for
$65 per share.0 9 Walton, a former Olinkraft shareholder, brought suit to
require Morgan Stanley to account for profits made from purchases of
Olinkraft stock.110 The Second Circuit reasoned that Morgan Stanley
owed no fiduciary duty to Olinkraft because Olinkraft and Morgan
Stanley had negotiated at arm's length."' Thus, since Morgan Stanley
had no fiduciary relationship with Olinkraft shareholders, the court held
that Morgan Stanley did not have a duty to disclose its confidential infor-
mation regarding Olinkraft's projected earnings."1
Although the Second Circuit held that Morgan Stanley owed no duty




' Id. at 798.
,,o Id. The Morgan Stanley decision does not indicate the precise point at which
Morgan Stanley purchased Olinkraft shares. See id. at 797. When Texas Eastern bid $51 for
Olinkraft shares, Olinkraft shares had been selling for between $31 and $39. Id. Johns-
Manville eventually bid $65. Id. Since the Johns-Manville bid was nearly double the pre-
Texas Eastern bid price, Morgan Stanley's profits appear to have been substantial. See id.
at 797-98.
'" Id. at 798. The Morgan Stanley court found that Morgan Stanley and Olinkraft had
separate duties at all times during their negotiations. Id. Olinkraft owed a duty to Olinkraft
shareholders, while Morgan Stanley owed a duty only to Kennecott. Id. The Second Circuit
rejected plaintiff's argument that Morgan Stanley became a fiduciary of Olinkraft upon
receipt of Olinkraft's material nonpublic information. Id. at 799. While the Second Circuit's
holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella that the mere posses-
sion of material, nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to disclose or abstain
from trading, Chiarella and Morgan Stanley are distinguishable. See Chiarella v. United
States, 455 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (duty to disclose does not arise upon mere possession of
material, nonpublic information).
Chiarella involved a financial printer's employee who never had prior dealings with the
parties with whom he traded. 445 U.S. at 231. Morgan Stanley did have dealings with
Olinkraft before trading in Oinkraft securities. See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.,
623 F.2d 696, 697 (2d Cir. 1980). When Morgan Stanley accepted Olinkraft's material, non-
public information with a condition upon the use of the information, Morgan Stanley
arguably placed itself in a position of trust and confidence with Olinkraft. See id. at 803
(Oakes, J., dissenting). Thus, the Morgan Stanley court could have ruled that Morgan
Stanley owed a duty to Olinkraft shareholders to abstain from trading in Olinkraft. See id.
11 See 623 F.2d at 799.
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14e-3."' Rule 14e-3 prohibits a person from causing the sale or purchase
of securities involved in a tender offer without disclosing his material
nonpublic information "relating to" the tender offer if the person knows
that he acquired the information from the bidder or target."' Causing a
sale or purchase includes a recommendation to a person that results in a
sale or purchase of a security.'15 At the time Texas Eastern made its
tender offer, Morgan Stanley possessed material information concerning
the value of Olinkraft securities."' Morgan Stanley knew the information
was nonpublic, and that it had acquired the information from the target
of a tender offer."7 Thus, if the confidential Olinkraft earnings projec-
tions "related to" the Texas Eastern tender offer, Morgan Stanley
violated rule 14e-3 by purchasing and by advising Johns-Manville to pur-
chase Olinkraft securities."'
Since rule 14e-3 does not define information that relates to a tender
offer, not all material, nonpublic information concerning a bidder or
target necessarily relates to a tender offer."9 A bidder's intent to make
or target's intent to oppose a tender offer are examples of information
that clearly relate to a tender offer."0 A target's projected earnings
13 See text accompanying notes 114-128 infra.
. See17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1981); text accompanying note 6 supra.
"' 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 n.38 (1980).
... See 623 F.2d at 797. The facts in Morgan Stanley do not indicate conclusively that
the case involved a tender offer within the meaning of rule 14e-3. See id. at 797-98. The facts
reveal, however, that Texas Eastern made a public announcement of an offer to purchase
Olinkraft shares at a price substantially higher than market price. Id. at 797. Johns-Manville
also made a public offer to purchase Olinkraft shares. Id. at 798. The court described the
Texas Eastern and Johns-Manville offers as bids. Id. at 797-98. Texas Eastern and Johns-
Manville made public offers for enough shares to acquire a controlling interest in Olinkraft
to more than 10 persons. See id. Therefore, the Texas Eastern and Johns-Manville bids ap-
pear to have been tender offers as defined in proposed SEC rule 14d-l(b)(1). See 44 Fed.
Reg. 70,349, 70,349-52 (1979) (proposed SEC rule defining tender offer); text accompanying
note 84 supra.
"' See 623 F.2d at 797; text accompanying note 6 supra.
... See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981); 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 n.35 (1980).
"' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981). The language of rule 14e-3 applies expressly to
material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer. Id. If the SEC had intended rule
14e-3 to apply to information relating to a bidder or target, but not relating to a tender offer
itself, the SEC could have drafted rule 14e-3 expressly to prohibit trading upon nonpublic
information relating to corporations involved in a tender offer. The SEC has published ex-
amples of information that relates to a tender offer. See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 n.35
(1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 70, 349, 70,353 (1979). All of the examples involve information that a
tender offer will be either made, withdrawn, or altered. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,413 n.35; 44
Fed. Reg. at 70,353; text accompanying note 120 infra. But see text accompanying notes
124-26 infra. The SEC's published examples of information that relates to a tender offer are
distinguishable from Olinkraft's earnings projections because the earnings projections do
not bear directly upon the tender offer. See 45 Fed. Reg. at 60,413 n.35; 44 Fed. Reg. at
70,353. Since the Olinkraft earnings projections had only an indirect relation to the Texas
Eastern tender offer, the information arguably did not relate to the tender offer within the
meaning of rule 14e-3. But see text accompanying notes 124-26.
" See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 n.35 (1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,353 (1979).
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arguably relate only to the target, and do not relate to the tender
offer.12' Thus, the Olinkraft earnings projections could have constituted
material, nonpublic information without relating to the Texas Eastern
tender offer within the meaning of rule 14e-3.1"' The ambiguity of the re-
quirement that material information relate to a tender offer, however,
does not preclude an interpretation of rule 14e-3 requiring a person in
possession of material nonpublic information concerning simply a bidder
or target to disclose his information before trading in bidder or target
securities."
The SEC has implied that any material information concerning a bid-
der or target relates to a tender offer under rule 14e-3." 4 The Commis-
sion maintains that information relating to a tender offer is not limited
to a bidder's intent to make or withdraw a tender offer, or to a bidder's
intent to increase the consideration for tendered shares."' Further, the
SEC has stated that information material to investors concerning an on-
going tender offer may relate to the tender offer.'26 Since knowledge of
Olinkraft's earnings projections would have been material to investors
contemplating the Texas Eastern tender offer, the information related
to the tender offer under the SEC's interpretation of rule 14e-3.1"
Therefore, Morgan Stanley would have violated rule 14e-3 because
Morgan Stanley failed to disclose its material, nonpublic information
relating to the Texas Eastern tender offer before purchasing and induc-
ing Johns-Manville to purchase target securities of that tender offer.
The exception to rule 14e-3(a) for multi-service financial institutions
would not have saved Morgan Stanley from liability because the Mer-
gers and Acquisitions Department did not disclose its knowledge of
Olinkraft's projected earnings before advising Johns-Manville to pur-
chase Olinkraft securities."'
... See id.; text accompanying note 118 supra.
122 Id.
" See text accompanying notes 124-26 infra.
.. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,353 (1979).
1" See 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,413 n.35 (1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,353 (1979).
" 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,353 (1979).
"= See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra.
12 See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1980); text accom-
panying notes 113-27 supra. The exception to rule 14e-3(a) for multi-service financial institu-
tions would not have saved Morgan Stanley from liability because the Mergers and Acquisi-
tions Department did not disclose publicly its knowledge of Olinkraft's projected earnings
before advising Johns-Manville to purchase Olinkraft securities. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3(a), (b) (1981); text accompanying notes 8 & 13-14 supra. Had the Mergers and Ac-
quisitions Department not advised Johns-Manville to buy Olinkraft, the exception might
have saved Morgan Stanley from liability under rule 14e-3(a). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b)
(1981); note 8 supra. The exception would have required Morgan Stanley to prove that its
Arbitrage Department, the actual purchaser of Olinkraft stock, did not possess the material
nonpublic information that Olinkraft provided to the Mergers and Acquisitions Department.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b) (1981); note 8 supra. The exception would also have required
Morgan Stanley to prove that it had established procedures reasonably designed to prevent
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Rule 14e-3 imposes upon a person who is not a corporate insider a
duty either to disclose his material, nonpublic information regarding a
tender offer or abstain from trading."9 The rule prohibits persons such
as Chiarella and Morgan Stanley from taking advantage of their non-
public market information to the disadvantage of uninformed traders."'0
The rule, however, does not affect the ability of a shareholder like
Simkins to trade in securities without disclosing information concerning
his personal market transactions. 3' Although rule 14e-3 accomplishes
the goal of the SEC to prohibit persons who are not corporate insiders
from trading in securities involved in a tender offer pursuant to material
nonpublic information,'32 the SEC's interpretation of the scope of rule
14e-3 is questionable.'33 Neither the statutory language'34 or the
legislative history'35 of section 14(e) encourages a finding that Congress
intended section 14(e) to create a disclosure duty broader than the duty
imposed under section 10(b). Federal circuit and district courts have held
uniformly that the duties imposed under section 14(e) do not exceed the
duties imposed under section 10(b). 3 ' Since Chiarella held that section
10(b) requires only a corporate insider to disclose material, nonpublic in-
interdepartmental communication of material nonpublic information. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-3(b); note 8 supra.
In addition to violating rule 14e-3(a), Morgan Stanley's communication of Olinkraft's
earnings projections to Johns-Manville violated rule 14e-3(d). Rule 14e-3(d) prohibits the
communication of material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer when violation of
rule 14e-3(a) is reasonably foreseeable. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (1981); text accompany-
ing note 10 supra (discussion of rule 14e-3(d)). When Morgan Stanley disclosed the Olinkraft
earnings projections to Johns-Manville, the information constituted material nonpublic in-
formation relating to the Texas Eastern tender offer. See Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
Inc., 623 F.2d 796, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1980); text accompanying notes 120-126 supra. Further-
more, since Morgan Stanley induced Johns-Manville to bid for Olinkraft shares, Morgan
Stanley knew that the communication of Olinkraft's confidential earnings projections likely
would result in Johns-Manville's trading pursuant to the information. See 623 F.2d at
797-98. The exception to rule 14e-3(d) allowing good faith communications to a bidder of
material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer would not have absolved Morgan
Stanley from liability. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d}(1)(i) (1981. Morgan Stanley's disclosure of
Olinkraft's earnings projections was not made in good faith because Morgan Stanley had
reason to know that Johns-Manville would purchase Olinkraft shares without disclosing the
information. See id., 45 Fed. Reg., 60,410, 60,417 (1980) (rule 14e-3(d) exception does not
apply if person knows or has reason to know that communication of information will result
in violation of rule 14e-3). Moreover, when Morgan Stanley communicated the information
to Johns-Manville, Johns-Manville was not a bidder. See 623 F.2d at 797.
12 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981).
13 See text accompanying notes 113-128 supra.
131 See text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
132 See text accompanying notes 113-128 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 52-78 supra.
"3 See text accompanying notes 52-77 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
129 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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formation before trading in target securities, rule 14e-3 appears to be an
invalid attempt of the SEC to extend the disclosure duty under section
14(e) beyond statutory limits. '
SAMUEL N. ALLEN
'" See Olden, SEC Rule On Tender Offer Nips Back On 'Chiarella,' Vol. 3 No. 20
LEGAL TiEus OF WASHINGTON 19, Oct. 20, 1980 at 19 (rule 14e-3 promulgated to circumvent
Chiarella).
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